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Abstract 
Over the past decade, artificial intelligence has demonstrated its efficiency in many 
different applications and a huge number of algorithms have become central and 
ubiquitous in our life. Their growing interest is essentially based on their capability to 
synthesize and process large amounts of data, and to help humans making decisions 
in a world of increasing complexity. Yet, the effectiveness of algorithms in bringing 
more and more relevant recommendations to humans may start to compete with 
human-alone decisions based on values other than pure efficacy. Here, we examine 
this tension in light of the emergence of several forms of digital normativity, and 
analyze how this normative role of AI may influence the ability of humans to remain 
subject of their life. The advent of AI technology imposes a need to achieve a 
balance between concrete material progress and progress of the mind to avoid any 
form of servitude. It has become essential that an ethical reflection accompany the 
current developments of intelligent algorithms beyond the sole question of their social 
acceptability. Such reflection should be anchored where AI technologies are being 
developed as well as in educational programs where their implications can be 
explained. 
 
Introduction 
Over the past two decades, digital technology has deeply changed our way of life 
and our relation to the world and to others, especially given today’s unprecedented 
computing and communication technologies and possibilities for easy access to large 
amounts of knowledge and information. Recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI) 
are now opening up ever-newer perspectives, enabling possible cooperation 
between humankind and digital technologies to think the world. This new step is 
possibly engendering a profound change in the course of human evolution, triggering 
both enthusiasm and concerns. Taking this turn, humans will need to learn how to 
live with the new possibilities that AI offers, so that new forms of “being-in-the-world” 
will develop for their benefit. In particular, they are invited to re-evaluate their role in 
societies merged with AI, where they will need to remain subjects of their collective 
and personal lives. 
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AI algorithms based on supervised learning are built by tuning the parameters of 
mathematical models to obtain the best possible correspondence between a set of 
input data and a set of output data. Once trained, they can then be used to make 
new predictions from new observations. Striking examples are artificial neural 
networks (ANNs) such as deep neural networks (DNNs)[1], which are inspired from 
biological neural networks. Thanks to the current availability of large computational 
power (e.g., GPUs or TPUs), AI algorithms can be trained on huge amounts of data 
over limited time spans, thereby definitely out-performing human learning times by 
several orders of magnitude. These algorithms can thus benefit in a blitz from the 
massive amount of available knowledge that mankind has accumulated over its 
history and/or over the world. Moreover, reinforcement learning[2] can also be a very 
efficient way to train ANNs on extremely large datasets self-generated in very limited 
time compared to the time humans would need to create them. As a result, 
algorithms can easily become more efficient than humans on specific tasks after 
relatively short training periods (typically a few hours or days, as compared to several 
years for humans). The past decade has demonstrated their technical efficiency in 
multiple specific domains, as for instance, optimization of financial transactions, 
speech or text recognition[3], language translation[4], real-time image content 
analysis, autonomous driving[5], or playing chess or go[6]. Beyond engineering 
applications, they are also starting to see use in medicine by assisting physicians in 
reaching diagnoses[7][8][9], or in the field of neuroprosthetics to design rehabilitation 
solutions that compensate functional deficits following a disease or an injury to the 
central nervous system[10][11][12][13]. AI algorithms also find applications in social 
contexts, such as providing assistance to judges with decisions rendered in courts of 
law1[14]. They have also shown greater efficacy than humans in inferring the sexual 
orientation of an individual based on only a few images [15]. This multiplicity of 
technical demonstrations is thus progressively bringing AI central and ubiquitous in 
human life.  
The growing role of algorithms is essentially based on their increasing efficiency to 
synthesize and process large amounts of data, helping humans to make decisions in 
a world of increasing complexity. Yet, the effectiveness of algorithms in bringing more 
and more relevant recommendations to humans may start to compete with human-
alone decisions based on values other than pure efficacy. Here, we examine this 
tension in light of the emergence of several forms of digital normativity, and analyze 
how this normative role of AI may influence the ability of humans to remain subject of 
their life. 
 
1. The advent of digital normativity in multiple forms 
																																																								1 Public Safety Assessment by Laura and John Arnold Foundation, 
arnoldfoundation.org ; Kennedy, House, Williams, 2013	
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The increasing role of AI algorithms has been accompanied by the advent of a digital 
normativity that can take several forms. The first one comes from the fact that 
algorithms tend to reproduce the trends that are most present in the data on which 
they have been trained. This creates a normalized view of the problem they are 
intended to solve. Interestingly enough for humans, the level of details that 
algorithms might be able to discriminate can be high, as for instance, in automated 
image pattern recognition[16] or autonomous driving[17]. This first form of digital 
normativity may thus often be satisfying enough for humans for them to rely on 
algorithmic recommendations. However, the automatic and thus objective processing 
of large datasets restitute general trends present in these datasets, whether ethically 
good or bad[18]. 
Another form of digital normativity arises from the use of predictive algorithms trained 
on objective observational data without accounting for the course through which this 
data has been generated. For instance, predictive algorithms used to provide a 
customer with purchasing suggestions only rely on previous purchases made by the 
same and other customers, without access to the personal reasons that led them to 
these purchases. This form of automatic data processing thus eliminates the inherent 
subjectivity of the customer. The individual is objectivized (normalized) by the 
algorithm[19]. This second form of digital normativity is actually a recursive and 
dynamic process: algorithmic recommendations emanating from previous human 
actions in turn influence their next actions[20][21]. 
The normative role of algorithms takes a third form when their efficiency outperforms 
that of humans. If, for a given application, an algorithm has a higher predictive power 
than by any human expert, it may become reasonable to rely solely on this algorithm 
for making decisions. In this manner, the algorithm creates the norm by imposing its 
efficacy. The efficacy becoming the norm, the question becomes whether the role of 
humans in determining for themselves the finality of this efficiency could be 
challenged. 
 
2. The human subject in the context of digital normativity 
The notion of "subject" is central in philosophy[22] (Descartes takes the “cogito ergo 
sum”, “I think”, as a starting point of all his philosophical researches). Being subject is 
the result of a construction (process of subjectivization), leading one to be aware of 
oneself as a subject, i.e., to be free and responsible for one's actions, and to be at 
the foundation of one's representations and judgments: "The I think must be able to 
accompany all my representations"[23]. This capacity to be an actor and be 
responsible for one’s life is progressively acquired as the result of situations 
encountered during a person’s life experience, including education, professional life, 
and more. A subject thus gets built according to his or her environment, which 
encompass the technologies that are available and their evolution[24]. 
Subjectivization is thus a fundamental movement that brings an individual to a state 
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of subject[25], and the question becomes whether this movement can be affected in 
the context of digital normativity. Can AI technology weaken, or on the contrary, be a 
new way to boost the capacity of human individuals to build themselves, to become 
subjects of their lives, to become authors of the norms that organize their individual 
and collective lives? 
Until recently, there would have been no valid reason for raising such a question. 
Indeed, it is humans who develop artificial intelligence algorithms and are thus the 
ones who impose the rules by which these algorithms learn to make predictions. This 
role places humans as the instructors of machines. In other words, human action 
remains required, and if algorithms make autonomous decisions without human 
intervention, these decisions still rely on a set of rules established by humans. In this 
sense, the autonomy of algorithms can be seen only in a technical sense, namely as 
an autonomy of execution, which preserves human subjectivization. However, 
algorithms are becoming ubiquitous in many aspects of the lives of people, and may 
thus also play a role in their construction as subjects. Indeed, subjectivization is 
progressively acquired by learning through the experiences acquired during one’s life 
(e.g., education, social relationships, professional experiences, sports, entertainment, 
etc.). Hence, because AI algorithms now constitute an important part of the human 
environment, they participate in the process of subjectivization. On the one hand, 
they offer unprecedented opportunities to strengthen this process. For instance, a 
search engine gives access to a huge amount of available knowledge in just a few 
clicks, thus offering new routes to any individual to build his or her critical judgment, a 
mandatory ability to become a subject. On the other hand, they may also bias the 
process of subjectivization. This could, for instance, be the case of a search engine 
that determines which results are put at the top of the list based on a statistical 
inference not accounting for the individual as a subject, but rather on raw 
desubjectivized data.   
Once subjectivization has been acquired, AI algorithms may also further influence 
how a person exerts him or herself as subject. Expressing oneself as the subject of 
actions may indeed no longer be desired by humans whenever algorithms may 
efficiently handle for them the tasks to be accomplished. This could be for sake of 
physical comfort when a task is physically demanding (e.g., requiring focused 
attention over a long period of time, such as driving long distances), or for the sake of 
psychological comfort when a task or a decision engages a moral responsibility that 
is difficult to endorse. For instance, algorithms are used in the justice system in 
Belgium to evaluate the risk of recidivism and help determine whether an imprisoned 
individual should benefit from anticipatory freedom. The responsibility of the judges 
may be increased and more difficult to stand if they decide against the 
recommendation of an algorithm. Indeed, in such case, if their decision is found to be 
inappropriate in the future, they could be opposed to have acted against an 
algorithmic decision considered more objective than any human decision[26]. 
Although it remains theoretically possible to resist this normative role of AI algorithms, 
the associated amplification of human responsibility could become so much of a 
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deterrent that disobedience would no longer be possible in practice. The ubiquity of 
algorithms in our daily lives may thus offer multiple opportunities for humans to 
progressively disengage from their role of subjects of their lives[27]. Therefore, 
attaining a stage where humans would systematically have to comply with the 
predictions of algorithms is no longer impossible, at least in specific domains. 
Algorithms could then become prescriptive by imposing their digital normativity, and 
thus no longer restricted with an autonomy of execution but acquiring a form of moral 
autonomy at the expense of human moral autonomy, and hence subjectivization. 
This could result in the emergence of a form of governance without subject.  
 
3. The risk of a silent human desubjectivization 
Despite the importance taken by algorithms in the organization of human societies, 
algorithms do not decide alone and, even if their complexity is highly evolved, 
humans still keep control over their own decisions as they decide how algorithms are 
built and how and for which purposes they are used. In other words, a cooperative 
relationship between humans and AI exists: on the one hand a form of expertise (the 
algorithm) and on the other hand the power to decide (humans). Each needs the 
other but both do not merge as one. Indeed, a qualification of decision differs from a 
qualification of expertise: a power to decide can be exerted in absence of expertise 
or against the recommendation of an expert, and conversely, an expert is not 
necessarily legitimate to decide. A decision requires intuition and know-how more 
than only argued and demonstrated knowledge, even though knowledge is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, step in the process of decision making[28][29][30]. 
Deciding is acting with doubts, thus accepting the risk of making errors, which is why 
any decision differs from simply knowledge. However, if humans were to decide to 
dispossess themselves from their power of decision, they would abandon an 
essential feature of their humanity, namely their capability to learn from errors, and 
would consequently put into question their power of perfectibility[31]. 
For current generations, humans remain vigilant regarding the power conferred to 
algorithms. But what about future generations born after the emergence of digital 
normativity, and thus well habituated with its ubiquity? When introducing the notion of 
voluntary servitude, La Boétie already seized this question to understand the 
foundations of despotic political powers. He pointed out that in a process of 
oppression, people are at first aware of losing their freedom but that the next 
generations make this world of oppression the rule and become either unaware of 
their servitude or accustomed to it: “(...) Those who come after serve without regret, 
and willingly do what their predecessors had done by constraint”[32]. The advent of 
algorithmic governmentality is however unique in the sense that it does not impose 
itself by any brutal or violent physical or moral means. By contrast, it progressively 
meddles into our environment through different changes of practice and stabilizes 
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always by habitude. This is where a risk of silent human desubjectivization could take 
root. 
This risk is then further reinforced by the challenge of explicability of algorithms. A 
predictive algorithm based on artificial neural networks is composed of mathematical 
functions governed by a set of parameters. These functions are chained together 
according to a specified architecture (defined by the developer of the algorithm) so 
that the outputs of some of them become the inputs of others. The parameters of the 
different functions are then optimized to make the algorithm most efficient on the task 
it is intended to solve. Although the methods used to optimize the parameters of AI 
algorithms are well understood, the resulting set of optimal parameters does not 
generally represent any intuitive or ecological meaning for a human being. In other 
words, these parameters may be optimal to best map observations onto predictions, 
but cannot be explained in any form of intelligibility comprehensible by humans. 
Specific studies aim at exploring and understanding the structure of trained artificial 
neural networks[33] but, most of the time, these algorithms remain opaque, with the 
impossibility for humans to fully understand how input observations are processed to 
infer predictions. Relying on algorithmic decisions may thus become critical when 
humans can no longer access the reasoning allowing the expertise of algorithms to 
surpass their own expertise. Indeed, understanding reasoning hinders applying a 
decision blindly without critical evaluation, and thus silencing the capability of the 
human subject to distinguish between the fair and the unfair. 
 
 
Conclusions 
AI has clearly become a unique opportunity for accompanying the evolution of human 
well-being, especially by freeing people from multiple constraints imposed by nature 
and helping in their quest for a better life. The ubiquity of AI algorithms in our 
everyday lives however brings a new major ethical challenge for humans: to preserve 
our capability to remain subjects and not only agents. Indeed, the advent of AI 
technology imposes a need to achieve a balance between concrete material 
progress and progress of the mind. AI should remain a tool, and the finality of this 
tool should remain in the hands of humans for the sake of freedom. Ethics should 
help in this respect by avoiding both “technophoby” and “technophily”, with the only 
constant concern being that what humans gain from technology is not at the expense 
of freedom and free will. The solution is not to hamper the development of algorithms, 
but to ensure that it does not lead humans to lose their capability to make choices 
with respect to human dignity and the capability to undo what has been made. 
Indeed, humans need to define and change themselves the rules by which they 
organize their collective life, including their life with AI technology. Far from either 
completely embracing or completely rejecting AI technologies, it has become 
essential that an ethical reflection accompany the current developments of intelligent 
algorithms beyond the sole question of their social acceptability. A thoughtful ethical 
reflection cannot be conducted independently from the scientific actors of AI 
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technology, and needs to be anchored with respect to the concrete applications that 
AI addresses, apprehending their values and their aims. Moreover, it should also aim 
at educating the next generations about the ethical implications of AI. This double 
scientific and societal anchoring of a pragmatic ethic is mandatory to preserve human 
subjectivization, free will, and freedom in the long term: "Techniques always bring 
with them the world in which they will make sense"[34]. AI should not be developed 
to invent the future for us, but rather to help us invent our future. 
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